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@hulumi/baseline: AccountFoundation reuse paths silently downgrade GuardDuty / Security Hub posture

Moderate severity GitHub Reviewed Published May 20, 2026 in kerberosmansour/hulumi • Updated Jun 10, 2026

Package

npm @hulumi/baseline (npm)

Affected versions

< 1.4.0

Patched versions

1.4.0

Description

Affected: @hulumi/baseline < 1.4.0 — Fixed in: 1.4.0 — Severity: Medium — CWE-693 (Protection Mechanism Failure)

Summary

AccountFoundation can either create AWS detective services (GuardDuty for threat detection, Security Hub for compliance dashboards) or reuse pre-existing ones via opt-in flags. The reuse paths just imported the existing resources and reported success — they never checked whether the existing services were actually doing their job.

  1. GuardDuty reuse. If the existing detector was suspended, or set to the slower 6-hour publishing cadence instead of the baseline 15-minute one, or otherwise misconfigured — Hulumi never noticed. The deployment succeeded with a misleadingly-positive guardDutyDetectorId output as if the baseline were active.
  2. Security Hub reuse. Although the account import was read-only, Hulumi unconditionally created the CIS / NIST StandardsSubscription resources with default delete behaviour. Pulumi then treated those subscriptions as its own — a later pulumi destroy of the stack would call BatchDisableStandards, unsubscribing the account from CIS / NIST compliance monitoring even on accounts that had those subscriptions before Hulumi ever ran.

Impact

Consumers using AccountFoundation's reuse mode could:

  • ship deployments that appeared to enable a detective baseline but actually weren't (case 1), or
  • accidentally turn off CIS / NIST compliance monitoring on an existing account just by destroying a Hulumi stack (case 2 — no malicious intent needed; a normal stack teardown was enough).

Patches

Upgrade to @hulumi/baseline@1.4.0.

  • GuardDuty reuse now asserts the imported detector is ENABLED with findingPublishingFrequency: FIFTEEN_MINUTES. Wrong posture fails the deploy at preview time.
  • Security Hub reuse creates the CIS / NIST StandardsSubscription resources with retainOnDelete: true, so destroying a reused stack no longer unsubscribes the account.

Net-new (non-reuse) deployments are unchanged.

Workarounds

Don't reuse pre-existing detective services with AccountFoundation before upgrading. If reuse is unavoidable, manually verify detector posture out-of-band.

Resources

  • PR #178 (Cluster G); regression tests in
    packages/baseline/tests/guardduty-reuse-posture.test.ts and
    packages/baseline/tests/securityhub-reuse-retain.test.ts.

References

@kerberosmansour kerberosmansour published to kerberosmansour/hulumi May 20, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Jun 10, 2026
Reviewed Jun 10, 2026
Last updated Jun 10, 2026

Severity

Moderate

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements None
Privileges Required Low
User interaction None
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity Low
Availability None
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality Low
Integrity High
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:H/SA:N

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(17th percentile)

Weaknesses

Protection Mechanism Failure

The product does not use or incorrectly uses a protection mechanism that provides sufficient defense against directed attacks against the product. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-48037

GHSA ID

GHSA-cj8g-prcm-mfg5

Source code

Credits

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