Vulnerability: CWE-362 — Concurrent Map Access Race Condition in InMemorySecret2FA

CWE: CWE-362 (Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization)

Affected Component

• github.com/pilinux/gorest — Go REST API boilerplate
• InMemorySecret2FA — in-memory 2FA secret store

Vulnerability Locations

Data Flow

Multiple HTTP goroutines (concurrent requests)
    │
    ├── handler/login.go:139 ─► map write ──┐
    ├── handler/twoFA.go:205 ─► map write ──┼── InMemorySecret2FA (bare map)
    ├── handler/twoFA.go:189 ─► map read ───┤      ▲  NO sync.RWMutex
    ├── handler/twoFA.go:245 ─► map read ───┤      │
    ├── handler/twoFA.go:491 ─► map read ───┤      │
    └── service/common.go:79 ─► map delete ─┘      │
                                                   │
            Go runtime detects concurrent map      │
            read+write or write+write              │
                │                                  │
                ▼                                  │
    fatal error: concurrent map read and map write │
    fatal error: concurrent map writes             │
                │                                  │
                ▼                                  │
         Process crash (DoS) ──────────────────────┘

Description

The InMemorySecret2FA in database/model/twoFA.go was defined as a package-level map[uint64]Secret2FA — a bare Go map with no synchronization primitive. Multiple HTTP handlers in handler/login.go and handler/twoFA.go read from and wrote to this map concurrently. Go's runtime detects unsynchronized concurrent map access and throws an unrecoverable fatal error, which crashes the entire process.

This is a CWE-362 race condition: the shared resource (the map) is accessed concurrently without proper synchronization, and the failure mode is a hard process crash (denial of service).

Trigger Conditions

1. Two users with 2FA enabled logging in simultaneously — concurrent map writes
2. One user logging in (map write) while another performs 2FA verification (map read)
3. Any concurrent combination of the 9 affected handler locations

Proof of Concept

# Simulate two concurrent logins with 2FA enabled
for i in 1 2; do
    curl -X POST http://target:8080/api/v1/login         -H "Content-Type: application/json"         -d "{"email":"user${i}@example.com","password":"testpass"}" &
done
wait

# Go runtime output:
# fatal error: concurrent map writes
# goroutine 34 [running]:
# runtime.throw({0x...})
#   runtime/map.go:...

Impact

• Availability (High): Hard process crash via Go runtime fatal error. No recovery possible — the process exits. An attacker can repeat the concurrent requests to crash the service on demand.
• Confidentiality (None): The crash itself does not leak data.
• Integrity (None): No data corruption (Go prevents it by crashing).

Fix (PR #391)

Introduced Secret2FAStore struct with sync.RWMutex protection:

// BEFORE: database/model/twoFA.go — bare map, no protection
var InMemorySecret2FA map[uint64]Secret2FA

// AFTER: Wrapped with sync.RWMutex
type Secret2FAStore struct {
    mu   sync.RWMutex
    data map[uint64]Secret2FA
}

func (s *Secret2FAStore) Get(key uint64) (Secret2FA, bool) {
    s.mu.RLock()
    defer s.mu.RUnlock()
    v, ok := s.data[key]
    return cloneSecret2FA(v), ok
}

func (s *Secret2FAStore) Set(key uint64, value Secret2FA) {
    s.mu.Lock()
    defer s.mu.Unlock()
    s.data[key] = cloneSecret2FA(value)
}

func (s *Secret2FAStore) Delete(key uint64) {
    s.mu.Lock()
    defer s.mu.Unlock()
    delete(s.data, key)
}

// cloneSecret2FA returns a deep copy of a Secret2FA.
// This prevents external code from mutating the store's data
// through shared slice backing arrays.
func cloneSecret2FA(v Secret2FA) Secret2FA {
	out := Secret2FA{Image: v.Image}
	if v.PassHash != nil {
		out.PassHash = append([]byte(nil), v.PassHash...)
	}
	if v.KeySalt != nil {
		out.KeySalt = append([]byte(nil), v.KeySalt...)
	}
	if v.Secret != nil {
		out.Secret = append([]byte(nil), v.Secret...)
	}
	return out
}

All 9 handler call sites updated from direct map access to store method calls.

Not Vulnerable (verified during audit)

• JWT: RSA keys from files, appleboy/gin-jwt middleware — correct
• Password hashing: Argon2 via pilinux/argon2 — correct
• SQL queries: GORM parameterized — correct
• CORS: validates wildcard+credentials combination at config load — correct

Patched Versions

All versions after PR #391 merge.

Resources

• Fix PR: pilinux/gorest#391

Credit

Reported by @saaa99999999 via manual security audit.

References

• GHSA-cpwg-x64r-rgwg
• pilinux/gorest#391